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NOTES

WILSON V BLOCK

Hesperus Peak and San Francisco Peak speak to one another.
Where they have placed their feet, I also will place my feet.
With its shoes I will go about,
With its legs I will go about,
With its power I will go about,
With its body I will go about,
With its mind, its voice, I will go about.
That which extends out from the top of its head, that also extends
out from the top of my head as I go about.
The things that extend around it are also being extended around
me, by these in blessing I go about.
Blessing is also extended around other mountains, with that in
blessing I go about.
I am long life-happiness, in blessing I go about.
Behind me it is blessed as I go about.
Before me it is blessed as I go about.
I have become blessed again, I have become blessed again.'
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Snow Bowl is a government-owned ski area located on the San
Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, Arizona.
The 777-acre Snow Bowl has been a downhill ski area since 1937. The
San Francisco Peaks, which comprise an area 75,000 acres in size, are
a predominant physical feature visible from portions of both the Hopi
and Navajo Indian reservations in northern Arizona.
Both the Navajo and the Hopi Indians consider the Peaks an important
part of their cultures. 2 The Navajos believe that the Peaks are one of the
four sacred mountains and are the home of certain deities. 3 The Navajos
believe the Peaks possess healing powers; thus, the Indians collect ceremonial herbs from, and perform religious rites on, the mountains. 4 The
Hopis believe that their Kachinas, spiritual emissaries from the Creator,
1. L. WYMAN, BLESSINGWAY 613 (1970) (reciting a version of Blessingway, a Navajo ceremonial,
as told by River Junction Curly).
2. See generally Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983), 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
3. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
4. Id.
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live on the Peaks and create the precipitation which sustains the Hopi
Villages.' The Hopis collect plants and animals from the Peaks for ceremonial uses. 6 The Navajos and the Hopis consider the Peaks a sacred
area vital to the practice of their respective religions.
In July 1977 Northland Recreation Company, which operated the Snow
Bowl under a permit from the United States Forest Service, submitted to
the Forest Service a "master plan" to expand the Snow Bowl by adding
new ski slopes, ski lifts, and lodge facilities.' The Forest Service conducted public workshops pursuant to the National Environment Policy
Act' and fashioned six alternatives to Northland's master plan. In June
1978 the Forest Service filed a draft environmental impact statement
evaluating the six alternatives and solicited input from the public, including the Navajo and Hopi Indians. In February 1979 the Coconino
National Forest Supervisor issued his Preferred Alternative 9 for the expansion of the Snow Bowl. He was overruled in February 1980 by the
Regional Forester, but the Preferred Alternative was reinstated by the
Chief Forester in December 1980.10
In March 1981 the Navajo Medicinemen's Association filed suit in the
District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of Agriculture, John Block; the Chief Forester, R. Max Peterson; the Forest
Service; and the United States. 1 Plaintiff sought a gradual removal of
the existing ski facilities on the Peaks, or an injunction against the further
development of the Snow Bowl. 2 The Hopi Tribe and Richard Wilson,
the owner of a ranch in the vicinity of the Snow Bowl, filed similar suits. 3
The three suits were consolidated by the district court. " The plaintiffs
alleged that the development of the Snow Bowl as described by the
Preferred Alternative would violate, inter alia, the Indians' first amendment rights to the free exercise. of their religions and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act. 5
5. F. WATERS, BOOK OF THE Hopi 165-66 (1963).

6. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370a (1983).
9. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739. The Preferred Alternative called for the construction of a new lodge
and ski lifts, the clearing of land for additional runs, and the widening and paving of the Snow
Bowl access road.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.at 740.
13. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C., June 15, 1981), Wilson v. Block, No.
81-0558 (D.D.C., June 15, 1981).
14. The suits consolidated were Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, No. 81-0481 (D.D.C., June 15,
1981); Navajo Medicinemen's Assn. v. Block, No. 81-0493 (D.D.C., June 15, 1981); and Wilson
v. Block, No. 81-0558 (D.D.C., June 15, 1981). The court consolidated these because questions
of law or fact were common to all three suits.
15. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1983). The plaintiffs also alleged
violations of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6 (1983); the National
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The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss Wilson's
complaint as to the first amendment and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act claims because Wilson lacked standing to assert the constitutional rights of the third party Indian plaintiffs. 6 The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment and, after a hearing, the district
court in June 1981 granted summary judgment to the defendants on all
issues except the National Historic Preservation Act claims.' 7 The case
was remanded to the Forest Service for additional proceedings. In May
1982 after finding the Forest Service in compliance with the requirements
of the National Historic Preservation Act, final judgment was entered for
the defendants on all issues.' 8 The plaintiffs appealed, and the defendants
agreed to stay their development until the case was resolved.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
conclusions.' 9 The court of appeals denied the plaintiff Indians' first
amendment claim, saying that they had failed to prove that the Snow
Bowl expansion would impair their right to the free exercise of their
religions. The court held that the Snow Bowl permit area was not indispensable to the plaintiffs' religious practices because the Indians could
continue to use other areas on the Peaks. The court further held that the
plaintiff Indians' right under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA) to practice their religions was not burdened by the Snow Bowl's
development. The court found the Forest Service in compliance with the
dictates of AIRFA because the agency had consulted with Indian leaders
and considered their views prior to the selection of the Preferred Alternative authorizing the ski area expansion.2'
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370 (1983); the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1983); the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§528-531 (1983); the
WildernessAct, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1983); the Administrative ProcedureAct, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551559 (1983); two statutes, 16 U.S.C. §§497, 551 (1983), governing land use permits for national
forest land; and the fiduciary duty owed the Indians by the federal government.
16. Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. 3073, 3073-74 (No. 81-0481, D.D.C., June
15, 1981), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956
(1983), 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
17. Id.
18. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739.
19. Id.
20. The court also considered the plaintiffs' other claims. First, the court held that because a rare
alpine plant was not formally listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act,
then the Forest Service did not violate the Act when it failed to evaluate the impact of the proposed
development on the plant's continued existence on the Peaks. Second, the court held that the Forest
Service complied with the National Historic Preservation Act when it conducted partial archeological
surveys of the permit area, consulted with the State Historic Preservation Officer, determined that
the Peaks themselves were ineligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, and
concluded that the development would not adversely affect the historical quality of the area. Third,
the court held that the Wilderness Act claim failed because although the Act authorized the president
to recommend as wilderness those lands contiguous to areas designated "primitive" by the Secretary
of Agriculture, no part of the Peaks had ever been designated primitive, and thus the Act did not
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This note will focus on the Hopis' and the Navajos' religious claims.
The first amendment free exercise clause as it applies to Native American
religions will be examined. The historical background of the American
Indian Religious Freedom Act and claims of religious infringement under
that statute will be explored. The impact of this case on attempts by
Native Americans to stop development on public lands by asserting first
amendment and American Indian Religious Freedom Act violations will
then be analyzed.
BACKGROUND
1. Native American FirstAmendment Free Exercise Claims
The first amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion. The
amendment reads in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "z
The government may not regulate or prohibit an individual's religious
freedom.22 The freedom to believe is absolute within the meaning of the
first amendment, 23 but the freedom to practice one's religion may be
subject to governmental regulation.2 4 A practice rooted in religion triggers
constitutional protection,25 but that protection may be overcome by compelling governmental interests "of the highest order."26 Once an individual proves his practice is religious, the burden shifts to the government
to justify actions infringing upon the individual's religious freedom.27
In cases where an infringement of the free exercise of religion has been
alleged, courts have applied a two-step analysis in determining the validity
of the infringement claim. This analysis first appeared in Sherbert v.
Verner," in which the plaintiff, fired because she refused to work on the
Sabbath Day of her religion, was denied unemployment compensation
because state law barred benefits to those who refused, without good
cause, to accept suitable work. The United States Supreme Court found
first, a burden on the free exercise of plaintiff's religion because the South
Carolina state law denying her financial benefits forced her to choose
apply. Fourth, the court held that 16 U.S.C. §§ 497, 551 constituted congressional authority for land
use permits issued to ski resort operators using national forest lands, and thus the Forest Service
did not violate these statutes when it issued land use permits to the Snow Bowl operators. With
respect to the plaintiffs' other claims, the court affirmed the opinion of the district court. See supra
note 15.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
23. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
24. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
25. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
26. Id.
27. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
28. Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
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between following her religious teachings and abandoning those teachings
in order to accept work. Second, the Court found that the state interest
in preventing fraudulent claims was not so compelling as to justify the
infringement of the plaintiff's constitutionally protected choice.29
This constitutional balancing test, oftentimes referred to as the Sherbert
analysis, consists of two findings by the court. First, a threshold determination is made as to whether the governmental action or regulation
complained of burdens the plaintiff's religious practices. The plaintiff
must show the "coercive effect of the [action] as it operates against the
practice of [his] religion.3" Second, if there is such a burden, then only
if the government's action is the least restrictive means of accomplishing
a compelling governmental interest will the burdensome action be upheld. 3 The government must show that its interest outweighs the interest
claiming protection under the first amendment.32 Such an analysis suggests
that although one's religious belief is immune from infringement under
the Constitution, the practice of that belief may not be so protected.33
This two-step analysis has been applied by courts faced with evaluating
claims by Native Americans that their religious freedom has been interfered with by governmental action.34
The application of the Sherbert analysis has resulted in findings that
certain governmental actions did not burden Indian religious practices.
In Sequoyah v. TVA, 35 the Cherokee Indian plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
completion of Tellico Dam, claiming that their first amendment right to
the free exercise of religion would be infringed upon by the flooding of
a valley sacred to their religion. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the relief sought after the court found no burden on the plaintiffs' religion.
The court found no showing that religious practices in the valley were
the "cornerstone" of, or played a "central role" in, the plaintiffs' religion.36 In Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation v. Peterson,37
29. Id. at 403-09.
30. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
31. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Empl. Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
32. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15. Yoder said that "only those interests of the highest order"
outweighed a legitimate free exercise claim. Id. at 215.
33. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
34. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981);
Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541
F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), affid, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983);
People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
35. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
36. Id. at 1164. The court noted that other Indian religious freedom cases had given protection
to those rituals which were the "centerpiece" or "cornerstone" of the religions. See, e.g., Frank v.
Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979), People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964).
37. 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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the plaintiffs sought to prevent the Forest Service from completing a road
in the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest, alleging
that the intrusions caused by logging and traffic were incompatible with
the sacredness of the area. Although the plaintiffs submitted evidence of
the centrality of the region to their religious practices, the District Court
for the Northern District of California denied the injunction sought after
finding that the road was not an impermissible burden on the plaintiffs'
religion so long as the Forest Service provided them with access to the
religious sites.3 In these cases, in the absence of a finding of a burden
on the free exercise of religion, the courts found no need to determine
whether the government had a compelling interest in infringing upon the
Indians' first amendment rights. These courts ended their constitutional
analyses with step one of the Sherbert test.
In other cases, courts have found it necessary to apply step two of the
Sherbert balancing test in evaluating Indian plaintiffs' claims of a first
amendment violation. In Crow v. Gullet, " the Lakota and Tsistsistas
Indians sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages, from the
State of South Dakota, alleging that the state's management of Bear Butte
State Park for the benefit of the general public destroyed the religious
sanctity of Bear Butte and violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
The District Court for South Dakota applied the Sherbert test. The court
found no burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom because restrictions
on access to the Butte were only partial and temporary, unnecessary
interference by tourists with religious rites was prevented, and requiring
camping permits and registration did not force the plaintiffs to violate
their religious beliefs. To the extent that the plaintiffs were temporarily
denied access to a ceremonial area, the court determined that the state's
limitation on the use of Bear Butte was the least restrictive means of
protecting both the welfare of park visitors and the park environment,
and thus this state interest outweighed the plaintiffs' interest in unrestricted
access to the Butte. Absent proof of a first amendment violation, the
court refused to enjoin the state action."
In Badoni v. Higginson,4 1 the Navajo Indian plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department of the Interior, alleging
that the management of Rainbow Bridge National Monument and Glen
Canyon Reservoir interfered with the plaintiffs' religious practices in two
ways: (a) maintaining the water level of the reservoir drowned Navajo
38. The court also said that the Forest Service had a statutory responsibility to manage its property
for the public's benefit and the desire of a "relatively few" people to use the national forest for
religious purposes did not obligate the Forest Service to limit the public's access to the public lands.
Id. at 954.
39. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
40. Id. at 793.
41. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
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deities and a prayer spot at Rainbow Bridge and (b) the sacredness of
the monument was desecrated when the National Park Service allowed
an influx of tourists. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the
religious significance of the monument and, by applying the second step
of the Sherbert analysis first, determined that the government's interest
in maintaining the level of the reservoir for "water storage and power
generation" and in assuring public access to Rainbow Bridge justified the
burden on the plaintiffs' religious practices.4 2 Because the governmental
interest was so compelling, the court found it unnecessary to determine
if the government's actions actually burdened the plaintiffs' religion and
concluded that no infringement upon the plaintiffs' first amendment rights
existed which justified granting the relief sought.43 The court made no
mention of the Sherbert requirement that the government's action be the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental objective.
In both Badoni and Crow, the courts determined that compelling governmental interests justified the alleged infringements upon the plaintiffs'
religious practices.
Despite the general reluctance of the judiciary to find infringements
by governments upon Native American first amendment rights, two state
courts have held that the Indians' freedom to practice their religions
outweighed the government's interest in infringing upon those practices.
In People v. Woody,' the California Supreme Court held that the state
statute proscribing the possession of peyote was an improper infringement
of the constitutional rights of the defendants, members of the Native
American Church. The court applied the Sherbert test and determined
first, that the prohibition on peyote burdened the free exercise of the
defendants' religion. The court said that the use of peyote in the ceremonies of the church was the "central event" and the "cornerstone" of
the religion.45 The use of peyote in the religious rites was so critical that
the statute proscribing such use denied the defendants the opportunity to
practice their religion. Second, the court concluded that the state's interest
in enforcing its narcotic laws and in preventing peyote's harmful effects
on the Indian community was not so compelling as to justify the burden
on the defendants' religion.4 6 The court balanced the values held by the
church and the state on a "symbolic scale of constitutionality" and con42. The court found support for the government's interest in the Colorado River Storage Project
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§620-620o (1982), the National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3
(1983), and the act establishing Glen Canyon National Recreation Area, 16 U.S.C. §460dd (1983).
Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177, 178-81.
43. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177-79.
44. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
45. The court noted that members of the church believed that "peyote embodies the Holy Spirit
and that those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with God." Id. at -, 394 P.2d at
817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
46. Id. at -. , 394 P.2d at 818-20, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74-76.
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cluded that the free exercise of religion outweighed the state's interests.47
In Frankv. State,4" the Alaska Supreme Court held that the first amendment protected the Athabascan Indian defendant who, in violation of state
game laws, killed a moose for a funeral potlatch. The court reversed the
defendant's conviction below saying that the potlatch was a religious
ceremony and obtaining fresh meat for the feast was a "cornerstone of
the ritual.", 49 The court implicitly applied Sherbertand found that although
the state had a strong interest in regulating hunting, it failed to demonstrate
that state laws justified infringing upon defendant's deeply rooted religious
practices. 0 The court concluded that the defendant's conduct was the
type of religious practice accorded protection under the first amendment
as applied to the states by the fourteenth amendment.5
The first amendment free exercise analysis has resulted in judicial
decisions that governmental action must be weighed against the interests
of Indian people in practicing their religions. At least in the federal courts,
judges have been reluctant to protect Indian religious practices which
conflict with governmental objectives. 2 This suggests that the judiciary's
general lack of knowledge about Native American religions is the reason
why the first amendment analysis invariably results in a defeat for the
Indians.
Courts recognize that Native American religious practices are not clearly
understood by the Anglo-American judiciary. 3 A problem all courts must
face in deciding if an Indian plaintiff has a valid first amendment free
exercise claim is determining whether the practice which is the subject
of the alleged infringement is religious. If a court perceives that Indian
religious practices parallel those of Anglo religions, the court is sympathetic to the Indians and more likely to find that their constitutional
54
rights have been violated by governmental actions. In People v. Woody,
the California Supreme Court reversed the defendants' conviction of illegal possession of peyote after it analogized the use of peyote to the use
of bread and wine in Christian rites. A similar analogy was employed by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Frank v. State,5" after witnesses stated that
47. Id. at -. , 394 P.2d at 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
48. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
49. Id. at 1071.
50. Id. at 1073-74.
51. Id. at 1070-71.
52. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Northwest
Indian Cemetery v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp.
785 (D.S.D. 1982), affrd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
53. See, e.g., Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068; People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69.
54. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
55. 604 P.2d 1068.
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fresh moose meat at a funeral potlatch was similar to the bread and wine
in Christianity.5 6 In Woody, peyote was deemed to be "an object of
worship" to which prayers were offered much like prayers to the Holy
Ghost.57
These decisions suggest that if an Anglo court perceives a Native
American religious practice as similar to an Anglo religious practice, the
court will protect it from unnecessary governmental interference. Conversely, if Anglo courts have difficulty in analogizing Indian religious
practices to those of Anglo religions, then the Indians are less likely to
prove that their religious freedom has been abridged. In those cases where
the Indian plaintiffs alleged that their use of sacred areas was infringed
upon by the government, the courts failed to draw an analogy to the
sacredness of Anglo religious sites, and the first amendment protection
claimed by the Indians was not forthcoming. 8 If a court is unable to
understand and accept a Native American practice as religious, the court
is not apt to accord that practice the protections of the first amendment.
2. The American Indian Religious FreedomAct
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act59 was passed by Congress
in 1978 in recognition of the uniqueness of Native American religions
and to ensure that the practice of these religions was protected by the
first amendment of the Constitution. ' Congress recognized that ignorance
about the traditional cultures of Native Americans was reflected in the
long history of federal actions which unnecessarily interfered with the
religious freedom of these Indians. 6
The legislative history of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA) indicates that many past infringements upon Native American
religious practices occurred because the governmental agency involved
was "unaware of the nature of traditional native religious practices." 62
56. Id. at 1072.
57. 61 Cal. 2d at -, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
58. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Northwest
Indian Cemetery v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp.
785 (D.S.D. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
59. The Act reads:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to protect
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express,
and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian . . , includiig but not
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.
42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1983).
60. 124 CoNG. REc. H21,444 (1978)(statement of Rep. Udall).
61. See H.R.REP. No. 1308, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1262, 1263.
62. Id. at 1265.
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Congress noted that "the traditional religions of the native American
people are not our religions and we are unaware of practices . . . of these
religions." 63 In discussing Indian religious sites and the significance of
protecting such areas, it was stated that non-Indian religions "have their
Jerusalems, . . . Vaticans, and Meccas." ' Congress was cognizant of
the fact that Native American religious practices were an "integral part"
of the Indians' culture, and recognized the need to protect these irreplaceable aspects of Indian life.65
The infringements on the Indians' religions were the result of the failure
of the federal government to specify a policy protecting the religious
freedom of Native Americans." Congress noted that federal protection
for Indian religious freedom existed, but only in a general sense.67 The
congressional intent in enacting AIRFA was not to accord Indian religions
favorable status. AIRFA was designed to avoid repetition of past wrongs
committed against the Indians due to ignorance on the part of federal
officials more familiar with Anglo-American religions.6" AIRFA focused
specifically on Indian religions and was designed to insure that federal
policy was implemented and effectuated with minimal interference with
the practice of these native religions.69
AIRFA requires federal agencies administering relevant laws to consult
with Native American religious leaders prior to instituting any policy,
procedure, or action in order to insure that traditional religious practices
are not interfered with by the federal government.7" Three areas of religious practice are specifically singled out by Congress as in need of
protection, although AIRFA's language does not limit federal protection
to those areas alone. 7' First, restrictions on access to sites sacred to Indians
were to be avoided wherever possible under the new federal policy. The
issue was not the public or private ownership of these areas, it was simply
whether Indians were denied access to their traditional religious sites in
their attempts to worship and perform ceremonies.72 Second, prohibitions
on the possession and use of substances and sacred objects73 were to be
63. 124 CONG. REC. H21,444, supra note 60.
64. Id.
65. American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469, 469 (1978).
66. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 61, at 1265.
67. Indian religious rights are protected by the U.S. Constitution, the 1968 Indian Civil Rights
Act, and state and tribal constitutions. H. REP. No. 1308, supra note 61 at 1262-63.
68. See generally H. R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 61 at 1265.
69. Id. at 1263.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1983); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 95-341, § 2,
92 Stat. 469 (1978). "Relevant laws" include those concerning wilderness and endangered species
preservation, and drug laws. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 61, at 1263-64. See also 124 CONG.
REc. H21,444, supra note 60.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1983).
72. H.R. REP. No. 1308, supra note 61, at 1263.
73. Examples given of sacred objects include peyote, pine leaves, feathers, and medicine bundles.
Id. at 1263-64.
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curtailed where such materials were necessary to the practice of the
Indians' religions. Many of the restrictions existed because of misunderstandings by non-Indian federal officials as to the religious significance
of these materials.74 Third, Congress noted that traditional Indian religious
ceremonies had been interfered with or prohibited by federal actions, and
concluded that although many of these intrusions were neither intentional
nor malicious, such governmental interference was nonetheless a threat
to the Indians' religious freedom.75
AIRFA is statutory support for the first amendment protection from
interference with the Indians' free exercise of religion. There is a growing
body of case law which states that statutes passed solely for the benefit
of the Indians must be liberally construed in their favor.7 6 AIRFA, however, as a relatively recent statute, has been interpreted by very few courts,
none of which have held that the alleged governmental infringement with
the Indians' religious freedom was prohibited by AIRFA.77 AIRFA has
been applied in conjunction with the first amendment free exercise clause.
The courts have, as a general rule, applied the constitutional and statutory
provisions separately in determining whether the governmental action at
issue infringes upon the Indians' religious freedom.78
In cases where an alleged AIRFA violation has been analyzed, the
courts have held that AIRFA requires only that federal officials evaluate
their policies and actions to insure that Indian religious practices are not
interfered with by federal agencies. In Hopi v. Block,79 the District Court
for the District of Columbia, the first court to interpret AIRFA, rejected
the Indian plaintiffs' claims that AIRFA required the Forest Service to
enjoin the alleged interference with the plaintiffs' religious practices on
the San Francisco Peaks. The court held that the Forest Service complied
with AIRFA's requirements when, prior to authorizing the expansion of
74. Id. Congress believed that it was possible to protect religious freedom while also upholding
the intent of relevant laws. See supra note 70.
75. Id. at 1264.
76. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
77. Hopi v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. 3073 (No. 81-0481, D.D.C., June 15, 1981), affd sub
nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), 464 U.S.
1056 (1984) (holding that AIRFA failed to protect against the ski area expansion); Northwest Indian
Cemetery v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (AIRFA did not prevent the building of
a road through an area sacred to Indians); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aft'd,
706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (AIRFA did not expressly apply to state
actions which restricted Indian access to ceremonial areas).
78. The courts have analyzed the Indian plaintiffs' first amendment claims independently of the
plaintiffs' alleged AIRFA violations. See Hopi v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. 3073 (No. 81-0481,
D.D.C., June 15, 1981), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 956 (1983), 464 U.S. 1056 (1984); Northwest Indian Cemetery v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp.
951 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
79. 8 INDIAN L. REP. 3073 (No. 81-0481, D.D.C., June 15, 1981), aff'd sub nom. Wilson v.
Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983), 464 U.S. 1056 (1984).
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the Snow Bowl ski area, the Forest Service examined its plans and met
with Indian leaders with the goal of safeguarding the Indians' religious
freedom. The court found that AIRFA's purpose was to protect the Indians'
constitutional rights, not to create religious rights in addition to the protections of the first amendment.8" In Northwest Indian Cemetery v. Peterson,8' the District Court for the Northern District of California cited
Hopi v. Block and concluded that the Forest Service complied with AIRFA
when it studied the plaintiffs' religious practices and selected a road
through Six Rivers National Forest which minimized the impact on the
Indians' sacred area.82
Other courts have been reluctant to either interpret AIRFA or apply the
statute to the alleged religious freedom violations before the courts. In
Crow v. Gullet,83 the District Court for South Dakota stated that AIRFA's
language expressly limited its application to federal agencies, thus implying that the Act was inapplicable to the state government defendants
charged with managing Bear Butte State Park in such a way as to violate
the Indians' constitutional rights.84 In Badoni v. Higginson,85 the Tenth
Circuit declined to apply AIRFA to the plaintiffs' claim that the Department of Interior had restricted their access to Rainbow Bridge, stating
that the plaintiffs had not alleged below that the defendant was in violation
of AIRFA.86 In Sequoyah v. TVA, 87 the Sixth Circuit refused to apply
AIRFA to the plaintiffs' demands that Tellico Dam not be built because
relief under the statute was barred by federal legislation which stated that
no law was to prevent the completion of the dam.88 The court believed
that to apply AIRFA would have been contrary to the congressional mandate authorizing the dam.89
These cases demonstrate that while AIRFA signalled the need for protection of Native American religious freedom, the statute is nothing more
than a policy statement. The statute is not meant to establish nor to convey
rights to the Indians. 9° The statute reiterates the Indians' preexisting constitutional right to practice their religions on federal land.9 In interpreting
80. Id. at 3076.
81. 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
82. Id. at 954.
83. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982), af'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
84. Id. at 793.
85. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
86. Id. at 180.
87. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
88. The court held that relief under AIRFA was barred by the "Energy and Water Development
Appropriation Bill, Pub. Law No. 96-69, signed by President Carter on September 25, 1979:
,notwithstanding ... any other law, .
TVA is ... directed to complete... Tellico Dam."' 620
F.2d at 1161.
89. Id.
90. 124 CONG. REC. H21,445 (1978)(statement of Rep. Roncalio).
91. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REc. H21,446 (1978)(statement of Rep. Risenhoover).
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AIRFA, the focus of the courts' inquiries has, for the most part, been on
the three areas of past violations listed by the Act as in need of protection:
access to religious sites, possession of sacred materials, and performance
of religious ceremonies. 92 AIRFA has been interpreted to require no more
than compliance with the first amendment. 93 Even a prime supporter of
the bill enacting AIRFA referred to the Act as having "no teeth in it." 94
DISCUSSION
The Hopis and the Navajos demanded a halt to the proposed expansion
of the federally-owned Snow Bowl and the removal of the manmade
structures on the San Francisco Peaks, claiming that the past and proposed
development infringed upon their religious freedom in violation of the
first amendment and AIRFA' The District of Columbia Circuit found
that the Snow Bowl expansion did not burden the plaintiffs' religious
practices because those practices could theoretically be accommodated
elsewhere on the Peaks. The court held that the 777-acre Snow Bowl was
not indispensable to the plaintiffs' religions because they were not completely denied access to the Peaks, nor were their religious rites infringed. 96 The court implicitly applied the Sherbert free exercise analysis
and determined that the plaintiffs had not proven that the expansion of
the Snow Bowl was an impermissible burden on their religious practices. 9'
The court found no need to balance the government's interest in expanding
the ski area against any infringement upon the plaintiffs' religions, and
declined to determine whether the expansion was the least restrictive
means of satisfying the government's interest.9"
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' contention that AIRFA prohibited
"all federal land uses that conflict or interfere with traditional Indian
religious beliefs or practices" unless the government had a very strong
interest in permitting such uses.99 The plaintiffs argued that the development of the Snow Bowl was not such an interest and that the ski area's
expansion was proscribed by AIRFA. The court disagreed, stating that
92. See Hopi v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. at 3076; Northwest Indian Cemetery, 552 F. Supp. at
954; Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 793. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1983).
93. See Hopi v. Block, 8 INDIAN L. REP. at 3076.
94. 124 CONG. REc. H21,445 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).
95. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739.
96. The Forest Service Final Environmental Impact Statement found that many locations on the
Peaks were potential sites for religious practices. Two Indian religious experts testified that the Snow
Bowl itself was not indispensable because religious practices could occur elsewhere on the Peaks.
Id. at 744-45. The court relied primarily on Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), a case
in which no first amendment violation was found where the plaintiffs had not proved that a soonto-be-flooded valley was indispensable or central to the plaintiffs' religion.
97. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 745.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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AIRFA only required federal agencies to avoid unnecessary interference
with the exercise of Indian religions, and held that the Forest Service had
complied with AIRFA when it consulted with Indian religious leaders
prior to deciding to expand the Snow Bowl.I °°
The Indians tried to convince the court that the 50-acre expansion of
the Snow Bowl would be a serious infringement upon their religious
freedom. The court was confronted with the conflict between the Indians'
constitutional right to practice their religions and the Forest Service's
statutory duty to administer federal lands for the benefit of the public.' 0
The court, in interpreting the first amendment and AIRFA, examined the
interests of the Indians and those of the Forest Service.
On one hand, since 1937, the Forest Service has administered the
operation of the successful and popular Snow Bowl. The policy of the
Forest Service is that, in the interest of the general public, outdoor recreation is to be promoted in the national forests." 2 On the other hand,
for hundreds of years both the Hopis and the Navajos have lived in the
vicinity of the San Francisco Peaks. The imposing presence of the mountains in an area otherwise devoid of predominant physical features suggests why the Indians consider the Peaks sacred.0 3 To the Hopis, the
mountains are alive and symbolize spirits which are "manifestations of
the one supreme creative power."'" The Navajos regard the mountains
as deities and believe that parts of the earth's body are represented in the
mountains. 5 The Peaks "have
for centuries played a central role in the
06
religions of the two tribes."1
The court's conclusion that the Snow Bowl was not indispensable to
the practice of the plaintiffs' religions misinterpreted the significance of
the Peaks to the Indians. The court assumed that the Hopis and the Navajos
could perform ceremonies outside of the Snow Bowl and could collect
sacred plants elsewhere on the Peaks. For the Anglo court to find that
the Indians could use other areas of the Peaks for religious purposes was
to be blind to the fact that the Indians saw the mountains as sacred. What
100. The court noted that the development would not interfere with the three areas identified by
AIRFA as in need of protection. The Snow Bowl expansion would neither deny the plaintiffs access
to the Peaks nor would it prevent them from gathering sacred objects. Id. at 747.
101. The national forests are set aside for the benefit of the public and the Forest Service has a
duty to manage the forests for outdoor recreation. See generally Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act
of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (0q83); 16 U.S.C. § 1609 (1983)(declaration of the national forest purpose).
102. Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §528 (1983).
103. The Indians believed that the mountains held great spiritual wealth for their cultures. Navajo
stories speak of the four sacred mountains, one of which is the San Francisco Peaks, and each of
which is visible from somewhere on the reservation. C. KLUCKHORN & D. LEiGHTON, THE NAvAJo
133 (Nat. Hist. Libr. rev. ed. 1962). The Hopis consider the Peaks to be spiritual symbols. F.
WATERs, BOOK OF THE Hopi 125 (1963).
104. WATEgs, supra note 103, at 125.
105. G. REiCHARD, NAVAJO REUtGION 14, 21 (U. Ariz. Press reprint 1983).
106. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738.
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the court failed to grasp was that, to the Indians, any displacement of
them from any of their traditional sacred areas was disastrous because of
the critical role the Peaks play in the cultures of the Hopis and the Navajos.
To the Hopis, the Peaks are sacred shrines which symbolize the southern
extent of Hopi lands." 7 To the Navajos, their world is inconceivable
without their sacred mountains.' 8
The court's analysis of the significance of the Snow Bowl to the Indians
gave short shrift to the utter centrality of the mountains to the cultures
of the Hopis and the Navajos. It is impossible to separate religion from
the culture of the Indians because they are so inextricably tied to one
another."9 It was improper for the Anglo court to decide whether the
Snow Bowl was indispensable to the religious practices of the Hopis and
the Navajos. That determination should have been left to the Indians
because only they fully understand the religious significance of the Snow
Bowl. The Hopis and the Navajos believed that their deities were being
interrupted by the Snow Bowl skiers. The argument the Indians tried to
make, and the court ignored, was that all of the Peaks were desacralized
by the presence of the Snow Bowl. Whether the ski area encompassed
50 acres or 75,000 acres, the point was that the Indians' religions, so
completely a part of their cultures, were sacrificed so that recreation on
the mountains could be enhanced. The court, in ignoring or failing to
note the inseparability of Indian religion and culture, perpetuated the
precise attitude AIRFA sought to overcome: insensitivity toward Native
American practices.
If a physical feature, such as a church or a holy city or even a mountain,
has always been an integral part of one's religious practices, the mere
threat of an alteration of, or an intrusion upon, that property is considered
a serious violation of the sacredness of that feature. The Peaks are sacred
to the Indians. The Hopis and the Navajos are being forced to surrender
a physical entity critical to their cultures as a whole. The Forest Service
wanted but a small portion of the sacred mountains for its ski area.
However, by taking the Snow Bowl, the government, supported by the
court, took much more in the sense that it deprived the Indians of an area
critical to their religious autonomy. The Snow Bowl is indispensable to
the religious integrity of the Peaks, and in turn that religious integrity is
indispensable to the Indians' cultural survival.
Neither the first amendment nor AIRFA accorded protection to the
religious practices of the Hopis and the Navajos. Although the Indians
said that the Snow Bowl expansion would affront their deities who lived
107. WATERS, supra note 103, at I11.
108. REiCHARD, supra note 105, at 452.
109. See WATERS, supranote 103, at ix-xiv; KLUCKHORN & LEIGHTON, supra note 103, at 17879. See also Wilson, 708 F.2d 735, 741 n.2.
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in the mountains and would cause the tribes spiritual discomfort,"0 the
court was unable to understand the exact nature of the impact of the
development. The court failed to recognize that the issue was not simply
the protection of the Indians' religions, it was a question of avoiding
cultural genocide.
CONCLUSION
The Hopis and the Navajos were unable to convince the court that the
Snow Bowl was critical to the Indians' religions and that any expansion
of the ski area would adversely affect the cultures of their people. The
Navajos consider all mountains, including the Peaks, to be holy people. "'
"These [sacred] mountains are our father and our mother. We came from
them; we depend upon them. . . . Each mountain is a person. The water
courses are their veins and arteries. The water in them is their life as our
blood is to our bodies."" 2 The court refused to acknowledge the Indians'
belief that to infringe upon their religion was to interfere with Indian life
itself. The Navajo language includes no word which translates as "religion" because the Navajo world is a whole, and religion cannot be
separated from daily life." 3 The interference with the Indians' use of the
Peaks is a direct blow to the Indians' cultural integrity.
The differences between Anglo and Native American religions are such
that the principles and practices of Indian religions are virtually incomprehensible to Anglo courts." 4 The decisions have shown that ignorance
about Native American religions is likely to result in a defeat for the
Indian who claims a freedom of religion violation. "' The first amendment
and AIRFA have not been helpful in safeguarding Indian religious practices, and thus there seems to be no real religious freedom protection for
Native Americans. The courts must accept the Indian definition of religious practices and must accord protection to these practices.
If the American Indian Religious Freedom Act is but a statement of
federal policy affirming the need to protect Native American religions,
then it is not surprising that courts are reluctant to apply AIRFA in such
a way as to insure that Indians will be successful in challenging governmental action allegedly infringing upon their religious practices. AIRFA
has yet to be construed by a court as support for an Indian's claim of a
110. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 740.
111. REICHARD, supra note 105, at 452.
112. Id. at 19-20 (quoting from A.M. Stephen, manuscript).
113. KLUCKHORN & LEIGHTON, supra note 103, at 179.
114. See KLUCKHORN & LEIGHTON, supra note 103, at 133; REICHARD, supra note 105, at xxxiii.
115. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954
(1981); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Northwest
Indian Cemetery v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp.
785 (D.S.D 1982), aft'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).

Winter 1986]

WILSON V. BLOCK

violation of religious freedom, and unlikely will be so construed until its
language expressly gives a court the power to apply it forcefully. In these
days of continuing ignorance and insensitivity toward Native American
cultures, it is a difficult task indeed to prove that infringement of religious
freedom has occurred. AIRFA, a "simple little resolution," 6 must be
amended by Congress and given the teeth necessary to create a cause of
action for Indian plaintiffs seeking relief from federal actions which interfere unnecessarily with Indian religious practices. AIRFA must be more
than a policy statement.
In the meantime, Native Americans who believe that their religious
freedom has been violated should steer away from the first amendment
and AIRFA as means to redress those alleged infringements. The Indians
might be more successful if they argue that they are being denied equal
protection of the laws with regard to the exercise of their religions. The
Indians should argue that their religious practices are not accorded the
same sort of protection that Anglo religious practices are. Native American
religions are improperly discriminated against because they are generally
not understood by Anglo governments and courts.
For the Hopis and the Navajos to be forced to surrender the Snow
Bowl despite the absolute sacredness of the Peaks is to treat the Indians'
religions and cultures with disrespect. To compel those people who pray
outdoors to accept the desecration of the Peaks by those who play outdoors
is to ignore the uniqueness of the Hopi and the Navajo religions.
MARY H. SMITH

116. 124 CONG. REc. H21,445 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall).

